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Abstract: The decisions made by food companies are a potent factor shaping the nutritional quality
of the food supply. A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocate for corporate
action to reduce salt levels in foods, but few data define the effectiveness of advocacy. This present
report describes the process evaluation of an advocacy intervention delivered by one Australian
NGO directly to food companies to reduce the salt content of processed foods. Food companies
were randomly assigned to intervention (n = 22) or control (n = 23) groups. Intervention group
companies were exposed to pre-planned and opportunistic communications, and control companies
to background activities. Seven pre-defined interim outcome measures provided an indication
of the effect of the intervention and were assessed using intention-to-treat analysis. These were
supplemented by qualitative data from nine semi-structured interviews. The mean number of public
communications supporting healthy food made by intervention companies was 1.5 versus 1.8 for
control companies (p = 0.63). Other outcomes, including the mean number of news articles, comments
and reports (1.2 vs. 1.4; p = 0.72), a published nutrition policy (23% vs. 44%; p = 0.21), public
commitment to the Australian government’s Food and Health Dialogue (FHD) (41% vs. 61%; p = 0.24),
evidence of a salt reduction plan (23% vs. 30%; p = 0.56), and mean number of communications with
the NGO (15 vs. 11; p = 0.28) were also not significantly different. Qualitative data indicated the
advocacy trial had little effect. The absence of detectable effects of the advocacy intervention on the
interim markers indicates there may be no impact of the NGO advocacy trial on the primary outcome
of salt reduction in processed foods.
Keywords: advocacy; food companies; salt reduction; randomized trial
1. Introduction
Salt reduction has been a recent focus of efforts to improve the quality of the packaged food
supply in a number of countries around the world [1,2]. In Australia, the estimated mean salt intake
in adults is 8–10 g/day [3,4]—about double the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended
maximum of 5 g/day [5] and the 2017 Suggested Dietary Target of the Australian government also
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5 g/day [6]. Raised blood pressure is a leading risk factor for preventable chronic diseases [7] and in all
likelihood excess dietary salt is a driver of premature stroke and heart attack in Australia [8]. While there
remains some debate about the effects of salt on health [9,10], systematic overviews that summarize the
totality of the available data are indicative of harm [11,12]. On this basis, the WHO recommends that all
member states seek to achieve a 30% reduction in the mean population intake of salt by 2025 [13].
Processed foods supply 75% of salt in the average Australian diet [14] with salt fulfilling functional,
technical, and taste roles [15]. Wide variations in the salt content of comparable foods for sale in
Australia highlight differences in both approaches to manufacturing and food company responses
to calls for salt reduction from government, industry groups, and civil society [16–21]. Established
business frameworks [22–25] are a way of understanding how macro-environmental factors and the
competitive landscape can influence company strategy, and by association actions to voluntarily reduce
salt, but data describing the impact of public health advocacy as a direct influence are sparse. There is
some limited evidence that advocacy targeting public health does have the potential to influence
corporate behaviour [26–28] but few studies have robustly assessed the effects of advocacy trials
on food company actions [29]. To address this, an intervention was designed to assess the effects
of advocacy by a non-governmental organization (NGO) to food companies and is described in the
study protocol [30]. The intervention sought to promote voluntary salt reduction in Australia and
was aligned with the goals of the Australian Food and Health Dialogue (FHD) [31]—a public–private
voluntary food reformulation initiative with an aim to reduce salt in processed foods.
As stated in the protocol [30] the primary outcome of the trial is the average salt content of
processed foods (mg/100 g) with the goal of making a difference between the randomized groups,
whereas the interim outcomes reported here are process-orientated. Process evaluations are useful to
provide information on the quality of implementation, and for understanding why an intervention was
successful or not [32]. Key considerations to the present study include the quality of the intervention
as underpinned by an adapted theory of change and context [32]. While randomization should help to
control how context affects the outcome, it is possible that that there were interactions between parts
of the intervention and the wider policy and business context at the time [30].
The aim of this process evaluation was to assess the extent to which the advocacy intervention
was delivered (the advocacy output) and received by the food companies, and assess the interim
outcomes (the advocacy outcomes) while considering the context.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Advocacy Trial
A total of 45 food companies with Australian-based production, distribution, or marketing
operations were included in the trial, and were randomized to receive the advocacy intervention
or control. A detailed description of the cluster randomized design and sampling methodology is
provided elsewhere [30]. The advocacy intervention was conducted in Australia, and commenced
in December 2013. Ethics committee approval was obtained from the University of Sydney Human
Research Ethics Committee for the conduct of interviews of the companies with written informed
consent obtained from participants. The trial is registered at ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT02373423).
2.1.1. Included Food Companies
In brief, companies were selected using an established branded food composition database
(‘database’) [33] to identify food companies with Australian-based production, distribution,
or marketing operations that had 20 or more processed food items recorded in 2011. The major
food categories in the database were mapped against the Australian New Zealand Standard Industrial
Classification (ANZSIC) to place companies into one or more food processing sectors, for example
meat and meat processing, baking, and ‘other processing’—processing not elsewhere classified, such as
frozen pre-prepared meals and seasonings [34].
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2.1.2. The Intervention
The advocacy intervention ran for 20 months, from December 2013 to July 2015. The intervention
was based upon an established theory of change model (COM-B, capability, opportunity, and
motivation) [35] adapted to an organizational context. The three aspects of COM-B together with actions
commonly used in NGO advocacy informed the design of the intervention (Table 1, Figures S1 and S2).
Table 1. Summary of the interventions and targeted organizational behaviour (capability, opportunity,
and motivation).
Advocacy Action Targeted Behaviour
(a) Opportunistic communications 1 Opportunity, motivation
(b) Programmed communication 1 Opportunity, motivation
Intervention 1 2—Letter writing with a call to action to promote the understanding of
salt and health and appeal to values of competition via the provision of competitor
data on mean salt content.
Motivation
Intervention 2 3—Collaboration with WASH. Letter writing with a call to action to
promote the success of best practice domestically and overseas.
Capability, motivation
Intervention 3 4—Within the context of Health Star Ratings. Letter writing with a call
to action to advise of available (NGO) resources, and disseminate
research/news/policy information to build the knowledge base.
Capability, motivation
1 includes the sending of ad hoc information, requests for contact, meetings and information; 2 A letter targeting
companies with whom the NGO had previously been unable to engage; 3 A letter targeting all companies; 4 A letter
targeting companies with whom the NGO was not already sharing nutritional composition data. WASH: World
Action on Salt and Health; NGO: non-governmental organization.
The advocacy intervention logic model shown in Figure S1 is described in detail in the study
protocol [30] and illustrates the overall design of the advocacy intervention, connections between
the theory of change model, and the intended advocacy outcomes. Briefly, the logic model depicts
a series of inputs enabling nine intervention functions akin to tools or methods (training, coercion,
incentivisiation, persuasion, education, restriction, environmental restructuring, and modelling) which
in turn enable advocacy actions. Examples of advocacy actions include framing (where communications
purposely promote a public health definition and interpretation of salt reduction to prevent chronic
disease [36,37]), promotion of best practice, publication of results of surveillance reports, and letter
writing with a call to action. Collectively, the resource inputs, intervention function, and advocacy
action formed the advocacy output. The advocacy output was delivered by a small team (<5) of
researchers at the NGO. Outputs were directed towards accessible individuals in food companies
considered most likely to have a vested interest in improving public health nutrition and innovating
for health. This included individuals with nutrition, research, development and senior management
roles. The intervention incorporated both programmed and opportunistic elements.
The first programmed intervention—Intervention 1 (Table 1) was sent to companies with
which the NGO was not already engaged and was based upon nutritional data showing where
the company ranked in terms of salt content in relevant product categories versus de-identified
competitors. The intervention aimed to promote understanding of salt and health, and appeal to values
of competition via the provision of competitor data on mean salt content and targeted organizational
motivation. The second programmed intervention—Intervention 2—was a letter with a call to
action on salt reduction done in collaboration with World Action on Salt and Health (WASH) [38].
The intervention included a letter from the Chairman of WASH citing the contribution of UK food
manufacturers to reducing salt in processed foods. The letter was sent to contacts by a researcher
together with a call to action asking what food companies could do to support the FHD and emulate
the success of their UK counterparts. The third programmed intervention—Intervention 3—was
done in the context of the Health Star Rating (HSR) initiative encouraging companies not already
working with the NGO to adopt the new front-of-pack labelling system in parallel with salt reduction.
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Two researchers contacted food companies advising them the NGO had calculated a rating for each of
their products recorded in the NGO database, alongside an offer of support in adopting the Health
Star Rating front-of-pack labelling system (HSR), announced in June 2014 [39].
Opportunistic elements included providing information, meetings, and requests to meet.
One example was a meeting to provide an update on salt reduction progress and exchange data.
These elements were informed by information that became available during the course of the
intervention period. In particular, the intervention was designed to integrate activity with background
initiatives led by the Australian government to promote a healthier processed food supply. In the first
instance, these included the FHD [31] and then increasingly, the HSR.
2.1.3. Control
Food companies assigned to the control had no specific interventions targeting them as part of this
study. The control companies were, however, exposed to ongoing background activities. Background
activities included publication of the results of surveillance reports using media releases to praise and
shame as well as promotion of an understanding of salt reduction and health outcomes. These were
delivered as part of the NGO and other non-governmental and governmental initiatives advocating
for healthier processed foods and salt reduction. For example, a media release from the NGO widely
disseminated the results of a study that evaluated the effects of the FHD targets on the sodium content
of three processed food categories [19]. Requests from control group companies made to the NGO
team implementing the intervention were responded to and followed up only when not doing so had
the potential to bestow an unfair competitive advantage.
2.2. Interim Process Evaluation
Seven interim outcome measures were chosen to examine how the interventions might affect
organizational opportunity, motivation, and capability as shown in the logic model. They also provide
an indication of the extent to which the intervention was delivered as intended and received by the
food companies. The pre-specified interim outcomes in the protocol were:
1. The number of and type of publicly available statements from food companies expressing support
for healthier processed foods.
2. The number of and type of publicly available statements from food companies expressing
non-support for healthier processed foods.
3. The number of food companies with a nutrition policy published on their website.
4. The level of engagement with the NGO as measured by a count of communications
(e.g., email, meetings).
5. The number of companies supporting the use of salt replacers/technologies in food processing to
reduce the quantity of sodium required in processing.
6. The number of companies supporting national salt reduction initiatives; and
7. The number of companies providing evidence of planned salt reduction.
In addition, a pre-specified objective of the qualitative assessment was to identify from interview
data the organizational capability, opportunity, and motivation to reduce salt across the product
portfolio, perceptions of the role of advocacy actions in effecting change, and contextual factors driving
nutrition actions.
2.3. Data Collection
2.3.1. Seven Interim Outcomes
Data were collected for the period from December 2013 to July 2015 for all interim outcomes.
Data for interim Outcome 4 (the level of engagement with the NGO) were collected from a log of
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all programmed and opportunistic communications that were entered into a standardized Excel
spreadsheet. Data for all other interim outcomes were drawn from searches of the Internet.
The Internet searches were done between September and November 2015 with the goal of
identifying (for all companies) the information relevant to the specified interim study outcomes
(see Section 2.2). Searches focused on the Australian websites of the companies, but global websites
were added as necessary to ensure that all relevant information was captured. Australian Food
News [40], Google, and News Bank [41] were the other major sources of information. Search terms
included the company trading name (and if appropriate common name or household brand names)
together with ‘salt’, ‘sodium’ ‘reduction’ ‘low’, ‘nutrition’, ‘health’ and ‘healthy’. The website of
the FHD [31] was checked to identify publicly declared evidence of support for the Australian
government initiative to reduce salt. The searches focused on information relating to the period
between December 2013 and July 2015, that corresponded to the intervention period. Two authors
(H.T. and K.P.) conducted these searches independently. Data were entered into a standardized Excel
spreadsheet with data for the first 15 companies collected by both authors and cross-checked to resolve
any differences. This ensured alignment of approach for data collection for the remaining 30 companies,
which was divided equally between H.T. and K.P. Together, H.T. and K.P. agreed on the final data to
report. Information about macro-environmental factors that might have influenced the effects of the
intervention on the interim outcomes was recorded as identified during the course of the study, at the
interview, and from internet searches.
Macro factors reported in the public domain, and assumed to be influential during the study
period, were recorded and filed as they occurred and were used to inform the interviews in year 2.
2.3.2. Interview Data
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with consenting participating food companies in
year 1 and year 2 and were done by the same researcher (H.T.) face-to-face or by phone with an average
duration of 30 min in year 2. This present study reports interviews in year 2 only. All interviews in year
2 were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. For the one interview, where there was a technical
issue with the recording, data were transcribed from written notes. The interviews in both years
sought to identify views on the status of Australian policy initiatives to reduce salt, other contextual
factors that were of concern to the company, and the implications for getting salt reduction onto the
company agenda. In year 2, food companies were also asked about the activities of the NGO over
the course of the trial to understand how advocacy actions had been received and their impact on
company behaviour.
2.4. Analysis
Interim outcome data were assessed using intention to treat analysis, with no imputation
for missing data. Statistical significance was defined using a two-sided α = 0.05. Analyses were
completed using Stata 13.1 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX, USA). Food company characteristics
were summarized for intervention and control groups and explored for chance baseline imbalances.
Differences in the interim outcomes between intervention and control groups were assessed by
comparing proportions and means depending upon the nature of the variable. We used a negative
binomial model for count variables that were over-dispersed, Mann–Whitney U Test for non-parametric
data, and the Fisher’s test for categorical data where the numbers were small.
The qualitative analysis of interview data was based upon the data from the semi-structured
interviews which were open-coded and organized by two authors (H.T. and A.M.T.) using
an inductive/deductive approach and a framing matrix aligned with the logic model. The data
were subsequently organized and combined into key themes to report the findings.
The logic model, which follows an impact pathway approach, was also used to make a summative
evaluation of the intervention program to assess whether the interventions were implemented as
planned, and to understand the reason for any gaps between intended and actual outcomes.
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3. Results
3.1. Companies Included
There were 215 potentially eligible companies identified for inclusion with 169 (79%) excluded
because they had fewer than 20 products in the database and one (0.5%) because it was reported to be
in receivership (Figure 1). Changes to ownership during follow-up occurred for three intervention
companies and two control companies. All intervention and control companies were invited to
participate in the year 1 and year 2 interviews—there were 12 (five intervention vs. seven control) in
year 1, and 9 (three intervention vs. six control) in year 2. Year 1* interviews were previously analysed
to inform the trial and are not reported in this present process evaluation report.
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Of the 45 companies included, 36 were large (≥200 employees), and 26 were in public ownership.
Companies in the intervention and control groups had similar baseline characteristics (p≥ 0.05) (Table 2).
Table 2. Baseline characteristics of included companies, N = 45 (100%).
Baseline Characteristics of Companies Intervention Control
n = 22 (%) n = 23 (%)
Industry sector 1
Meat-related processing and manufacturing 3 (14) 4 (17)
Dairy, oil and fat-related processing and manufacturing 8 (36) 9 (39)
Cereal, pasta and baking mix manufacturing 9 (41) 8 (35)
Other food product manufacturing 14 (64) 10 (43)
Seafood processing 7 (32) 4 (17)
Fruit and vegetable processing 13 (59) 12 (52)
Bread and bakery manufacturing 8 (36) 6 (26)
Snack-foods and confectionery manufacturing 4 (18) 6 (26)
Company size
Large (≥200 employees) 17 (77) 19 (83)
Small-medium (≤199 employees) 5 (23) 4 (17)
Company ownership
Private 8 (36) 11 (48)
Public 14 (64) 12 (52)
Participant in Public Health Nutrition initiatives 2
None 10 (45) 6 (26)
One initiative 3 (14) 6 (26)
Two initiatives 5 (22) 4 (17)
Three initiatives 3 (14) 6 (26)
Four initiatives 1 (5) 1 (5)
1 Summary of industry sectors based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification
(ANZSIC) [34]. One or more class descriptions can apply to a single food company. 2 Includes: Previous commitment
to the Australian Division of World Action on Salt and Health Drop the Salt! Campaign (2007–2012) [42]; Australian
Food and Health Dialogue participant [31]; Use of Heart Foundation Tick logo on the front of pack of one or more
products 2013 [43]; Member of the Australian Food and Grocery Council Healthier Australia Commitment 2013 [44].
3.2. The Intervention Program
There were three rounds of programmed intervention and a series of ongoing opportunistic
interventions (sending out of ad hoc information, requests for contact, meetings and information) that
were targeted at the intervention group.
The first programmed intervention (Intervention 1) designed to target organizational motivation
achieved a response rate of 31% with half of that being simply an acknowledgement that the information
had been received. Intervention 2 targeted both organizational capability and motivation. Nine of 22
companies responded (41%) with six indicating possible action but three being acknowledgement
only. Intervention 3 targeted organizational motivation and capability and achieved a response rate of
25%—two responded with acknowledgement and three with an inference of further action.
There were varied additional opportunistic communications targeting organizational opportunity
and motivation, for example through the sending out of ad hoc information, requests for contact,
meetings, and information exchange between researchers at the NGO. Overall, 16 of the 22 (73%)
intervention companies were engaged with a mean of two substantive episodes for each intervention
company. A substantive episode typically included ongoing meetings around an issue or the provision
of data about the nutritional composition of foods. After all programmed and opportunistic attempts
to engage there were still five (23%) intervention companies the NGO was unable to involve during
the course of the advocacy trial. Eleven control companies also contacted the NGO spontaneously
during the study period, with a mean of 0.7 substantive episodes of interaction each.
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Using the logic model (Figure S1) to assess whether the interventions were implemented as
planned showed that the trial had not delivered an intervention to support the use of healthier
ingredients/technologies, where an interim outcome was the support of low salt alternatives in
processing. All other advocacy actions were employed to deliver both opportunistic and programmed
communications. Advocacy actions to frame media communications with respect to a consumer right
of choice to healthy food, frame the media to praise/shame, and disseminate the research/news
policy information to build the knowledge base also formed a large part of the NGO background
activities—to which both control and intervention groups were exposed. When assessed by target
behaviour, only the interventions targeting support of low salt alternatives (organizational opportunity)
and sharing of knowledge on where to go for salt reduction technical advice (organizational capability)
were not implemented as planned.
3.3. Interim Outcomes
There were no detectable differences in any of the pre-defined interim outcomes between
the intervention and control groups (Table 3). The number of companies that made supportive
communications was 15 for intervention companies and 14 for control companies (p = 0.63) and the
corresponding numbers that were the subject of non-supportive communications were 11 intervention
and 12 control companies (p = 0.74). Varied supportive communications were delivered as news,
comments, and reports, but the mean number made by each company was modest (1.2 intervention
vs. 1.4 control). Fewer intervention vs. control companies had a nutrition policy published on their
website (23% vs. 46%), although this was not statistically significant (p = 0.21). Likewise, the proportion
of intervention companies supporting the FHD was 41% vs. 61% of control companies (p = 0.24) and
the percentages with respect to evidence of a salt reduction plan were 23% vs. 30% (p = 0.56). The mean
number (range) of communications with the NGO for each intervention company during the study
period was 15 (6–53) vs. 11 (5–25) of control companies (p = 0.28).
Table 3. Comparison of intervention and control group interim outcomes.
Targeted
Organizational Change Interim Outcome Number of Companies
1 Number of Outcomes per
Company, Mean (Range) 1
n = 22 (%) n = 23 (%)
Intervention Control Intervention Control
Opportunity, motivation Companies publishing supportivecommunications: 15 (68%) 14 (61%) 1.5 (0–8) 1.8 (0–6)
Supportive media releases 2 (9%) 5 (22%) 0.1 (0–1) 0.3 (0–2)
Supportive other statements 4 (18%) 3 (13%) 0.2 (0–2) 0.2 (0–2)
Supportive news, comments, and reports 14 (64%) 14 (61%) 1.2 (0–6) 1.4 (0.5)
Opportunity, motivation Total number of unsupportivecommunications: 11 (50%) 12 (52%) 1 (0–6) 1 (0–4)
Unsupportive media releases 0 0 0 0
Unsupportive other statements 1 (5%) 1 (4%) <0.01 (0–1) <0.01 (0–1)
Unsupportive news, comments, and reports 11 (50%) 11 (48%) 1 (0–5) 0.9 (0–4)
Opportunity, motivation,
capability Total number of NGO communications: 22 (100%) 23 (100%) 15 (6–53) 11 (5–25)
Update meetings 9 (41%) 4 (17%) 0.8 (0–5) 0.3 (0–3)
Data exchange 3 (14%) 5 (22%) 0.1 (1–0) 0.4 (1–3)
Events 6 (27%) 4 (17%) 0.8 (1–5) 0.2 (1–2)
Project/ongoing work 5 (23%) 3 (13%) 0.3 (1–2) 0.2 (1–2)
Motivation Companies with a nutrition policy 5 (23%) 10 (44%) - -
Motivation Companies supporting the AustralianFood and Health Dialogue 9 (41%) 14 (61%) - -
Motivation, capability Companies providing evidence of plannedsalt reduction 5 (23%) 7 (30%) - -
Motivation, capability Companies using salt replacer technology - - - -
1 There were no statistically significant differences between the outcome measures (p > 0.05 for all pairwise
comparisons).
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3.4. Qualitative Findings
Nine food companies consented to an interview: three intervention companies and six control
companies. The identified drivers of nutrition actions over the 12 months prior to interview were
similar for both groups, with no detectable effect of the advocacy intervention.
The HSR front-of-pack labelling system [39] was identified as the primary driver of company
action related to nutrition during the study period. Identified motivating factors for participation in
the HSR system were competition, transparency, and congruence with company values. Reasons for
not participating were a ‘wait and see’ attitude, insufficient rationale given their product portfolio,
and competing business priorities. Implementation of the HSR policy was seen as presenting
an opportunity to review the nutritional content of products, including salt content, by several companies.
The other government initiative, the FHD, which had a strong focus on salt and reformulation, was noted
by all those involved to be dormant and while support for the FHD was evident, none were unduly
concerned about the lack of activity. All were following their own nutritional plan—“we just know what
to do in terms of our strategy and we’re following that” (Company A1).
Consumers were identified as key—“everything we do is consumer-led” (Company A2) and many
companies identified sugar as the nutrient they believed that consumers were most concerned about.
Accordingly, efforts to reduce sugar were a focus compared to (but not necessarily at the expense of)
salt reduction. Salt was identified by only one company as having consumer attention and that was
for a specific category and consumer demographic. However, most companies indicated that salt was
a part of, but not necessarily a priority, of their internal nutritional plans.
Engagements with NGOs in general were clearly separated in terms of those that partnered and
those that provoked food companies, with all companies preferring collaboration and partnership.
A shared vision and strategy to achieve this were described as prerequisites to maintaining existing
working relationships or building future ones—“with that higher purpose clearly anchoring everything that
the NGO (TGI) does I think it would make it much easier for us to connect in and maybe collaborate on trying to
deliver that goal” (Company A3).
Advocacy actions involving the provision of product nutritional data and actions directly related
to supporting the implementation of the HSR system resulted in the highest level of engagement.
Five companies identified the HSR system implementation process as an opportunity to review
the nutritional composition of their products. Two control group companies explicitly described
substantial contact over a number of weeks that culminated in a collaborative working relationship as
“much more of a partnership” (Company A4). The level of engagement was influenced by how accurate
the companies perceived the NGO’s nutritional data to be. For example, where the data were perceived
to be inaccurate, with a possible threat to their reputation, companies were motivated to engage with
the NGO. Another motivation for engaging with the NGO mentioned by two companies was the NGO
research expertise in the context of a trusted source of data disseminated through the media, but also in
project work. Although all intervention companies mentioned the FHD, HSR, and data, none recalled
either of the other two programmed interventions implemented by the NGO.
4. Discussion
In this process evaluation we identified no differences between the intervention and control
groups in any of the pre-defined interim outcome measures designed to evaluate the interim effect of
the advocacy intervention on Australian food companies. This suggests that there may be no impact of
the advocacy intervention on the primary downstream outcome of salt reduction, although it is also
possible that the chosen interim measures are not indicative of efficacy for that measure.
The advocacy intervention was formulated as a logic model with components targeting
organizational opportunity, capability, and motivation based upon the COM-B model for achieving
behavioural change [35]. The intervention was designed to encourage collective support for salt
reduction and integrate activity with background policy initiatives such as the FHD. The project
utilized several intervention functions (enablement, education, modelling, and persuasion) via the
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provision of data and targeted organizational opportunity, capability, and motivation to reduce salt in
foods. It was also intended that the intervention companies would gain knowledge and legitimacy for
their nutrition actions as well as a bolstered image of social responsibility [45–47].
The possible reasons for failure of the advocacy intervention to impact upon the interim
outcomes are multiple. Companies were difficult to engage, with many being minimally or completely
non-responsive to the approaches made. Most appeared to have existing corporate positions on salt
reduction (and nutrition more broadly) that were difficult to shift with evidence, a referral to a positive
overseas experience, or a reference to local government initiatives such as the FHD.
The ability of the NGO to provide food companies nutritional composition data [48] for hundreds
of food products over a period of time was a distinguishing feature of the advocacy intervention,
and yet this partnership approach still did not elicit a strong response from the intervention companies.
This finding could suggest that companies may have already known this information through ongoing
competitor tracking [49], did not trust the NGO data, or that salt reduction was not deemed to be of
sufficiently high priority [50]. Conversely, referencing the government’s HSR initiative [39] appeared to
offer an opportunity because ‘the marketers now see a front-of-pack benefit in improving nutrition in a product’
(Company B1), although the potential for salt reduction per se was generally perceived to be curbed
with rather few opportunities to differentiate and reformulate in some food categories. A systematic
assessment of where each company was on the ‘salt reduction journey’ may have improved the
response rate, although the limited number of public documents available to make this assessment,
in conjunction with the difficulty of getting corporate participation in interviews, would have made
this challenging.
Another possible reason for the absence of a detectable difference in interim outcomes between
randomized groups is that the NGO also had multiple interactions with the control group during the
study period. This ‘drop in’ likely biased the effects of the advocacy intervention towards the null.
While intervention companies were on average targeted with, and exposed to, more intervention,
active neglect of the control group would likely have resulted in a greater contrast. Active neglect
was not, however, something that was deemed feasible or desirable at the outset of the trial because
the NGO was leading NGO salt reduction efforts in Australia. This decision has almost certainly
mitigated against a maximally robust test of the hypothesis that advocacy can affect company actions
on salt reduction.
This interim process evaluation has shown how the limited resources available to the NGO also
adversely impacted the fidelity of the advocacy work with the frequency of programmed interventions
being low and tailoring of the advocacy message being limited. Likewise, the capacity of the NGO
to conduct and disseminate supporting research, interact with the media and adequately respond to
some intervention company requests was challenging. Email as the most convenient and cost-effective
mode of delivery was used in the programmed interventions. For each company, a primary point
of contact was identified [51] but a more strategic approach targeting multiple individuals with
messages tailored to the different and changing roles of the key individuals in each company would
almost certainly have achieved better engagement. This might have involved hosting a series of
web-based and face-to-face roundtables for senior managers. A failure to appreciate the time and
resources required to effectively implement programmed and opportunistic communications was
compounded by involvement in background actions such as publishing company comparisons and
newsletters to which the control and intervention groups were both exposed. Further, the approach
taken was to engage with food companies using tactics that were non-disruptive, are promoted
in public health nutrition advocacy [29,52] and aligned to the public-private partnership model of
the FHD. The overall advocacy approach tested was one orientated to relationship building to form
organizational partnerships—where the level of interaction varied from limited to involved [53].
The inherent conflict of interest between profit from unhealthy food versus health [50], and the
over-riding commercial drivers behind the food industry were another issue for which there was
no clear solution identified. Public–private partnerships [54,55] like the FHD have the capacity to
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overcome this challenge, at least in part, if robustly implemented and evaluated [56]. However,
while the FHD led with salt reduction when first established, there was almost no activity post-2013,
which was the period in which our study was performed. Few companies were willing to step off the
sidelines and publicly support a national salt reduction initiative in the absence of leadership from the
government. A very similar pattern has been observed with climate change [57] where it is only with the
setting of clear long-term goals that real action appears likely to be achieved [58]. The splintered nature
of food advocacy organizations and the absence of the coordinated global approach taken by climate
advocates provide for a very weak response to a huge and enormously influential food industry [59].
A key strength of the trial was the randomized design selected to overcome the many challenges
of quantifying the effects of advocacy in an unbiased way [60–62]. While the number of companies
included was fairly small, we were able to stratify randomization based on company ownership, size of
the company, and industry sector to reduce baseline differences between groups [30]. The adapted
theory of change framework we used, although previously untested in this setting, was supported
by strong literature, and in conjunction with the logic model provided a highly credible theoretical
basis for the intervention program [32,63]. Pre-specification of the main design features in a published
protocol protected against post hoc data-driven conclusions.
However, as we are unaware of process evaluation studies reporting results from comparable
advocacy interventions, it is difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this study in relation
to others. Evaluations of advocacy to improve the healthfulness of food, particularly in the area of
nutrition–obesity prevention, are similarly sparse [64]. Nonetheless, advocacy for salt reduction is
widely considered key to changing the government agenda and creating consumer awareness and
pressure [65]. Raising consumer awareness of salt and health as part of the UK salt reduction campaign
was considered to be fundamental to its success, alongside engaging with the food industry [65,66].
Likewise, we sought to engage with the food industry and the qualitative findings support the need
for consumer advocacy given that consumer pressure would almost certainly get the attention of
food companies. While background activities included actions to influence public opinion and the
government agenda, the design aimed to target food companies directly. Future studies could usefully
evaluate the effect of consumer advocacy programs on food company behaviour.
In terms of weaknesses, and aside from those already identified, the primary shortcomings were
the sample size and the limited power to detect plausible small to moderate effects on the interim
outcomes. The inclusion of more companies but with fewer products (<20) [30] would have increased
the sample size, but the design aimed to include market leaders consistent with the FHD strategy [31].
Access to sales data would determine the likelihood of smaller companies owning a market leading
brand and the impact of excluding companies with few products in their portfolio. This process
evaluation may have benefited from a comparison of baseline and interim outcomes but it is unlikely
this would have substantively changed the overall conclusion given that salt reduction was largely
absent from the agenda of the consumer and government at the time the advocacy intervention was
initiated. In addition, it is possible that there was insufficient time for the effects of the advocacy
intervention to take effect. Finally, the proportion of companies agreeing to the interviews was modest,
and it is likely participants in the interviews were different to non-participants—this introduces some
uncertainty into the conclusions we drew from the qualitative analysis, although the main messages
we highlighted came across so strongly that they seem unlikely to be the result of bias alone. We also
sought to enhance objectivity in the qualitative analysis by involving a second researcher (A.M.T) not
actively involved in the implementation of the intervention or data collection.
In conclusion, this research suggests no effects of an Australian NGO advocacy program on
corporate nutrition actions to reduce salt. The final results will define the ultimate effects on the
primary outcome of average salt content in foods, but the present data suggest that this may be a null
result. This will have important implications for policy-based initiatives to reduce population salt
intake, with the likely conclusions being that either advocacy actions, whether delivered by an NGO,
other types of organizations, or coalitions involving a mix of multiple stakeholders, must be much
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more intensive, or that government-led strategies, alone or in combination with NGO advocacy, will be
required to deliver real change.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at www.mdpi.com/2072-6643/9/10/1128/s1,
Figure S1: Advocacy intervention logic model, Figure S2: Change model.
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